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and invested with special powers relating to the government of its own
local affairs. Vaughtman v. Town of Waterloo, 14 Ind. App. 649. A
municipal corporation possesses a corporate capacity distinct from the
State. Hanson v. Cresco, 132 Iowa 533, 109 N. W. 1109. The State is
not a municipal corporation. Armstrong v. State Bank of Mayville, 227
N. Y. 563. Hays v. McDaniel, (1917) 130 Ark. 52, 196 S. W. 934. 43
Corpus Juris 72, Sec. 10.
Since the State is not a municipal corporation, it.must therefore give
compensation for damages without being allowed to consider the benefits
in determining the price to be paid the property owner.
This is the first decision on this precise point in Indiana and comes at
a time when the State's highway improvement projects render it an
important decision. The Supreme Court in this case has clearly decided
in accord with both principle and authority. T. H. F.
EVIDENC--REs GESTAE--CONNECTING CIRCUMSTANCES-Charles Phil-
lips, an employee of G. W. Opell Company, had loaded a truck with bread
at his employer's plant and, before delivering this bread, returned to his
home at 5 a. m., as was his custom, to eat breakfast. After eating he went
outside with a bucket of water to fill the radiator, and while doing this
was shot and died soon after. Before dying he told his wife that one
Green, a neighbor, had fired the shot. The police were notified; they
arrested Green, took him to the police station, and held a conversation
with him about 1 hours after the shooting. Phillips' widow brought
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act against appellant,
and introduced as a witness the chief of police who had examined Green.
Appellant objected to this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay
as to Green's declarations made to the witness. From an award in favor
of appellee, the G. W. Opell Company appeals. Held: Reversed with
directions-to Industrial Board to set aside its award. The testimony of
what Green said was incompetent, and without it there is no basis for an
award of compensation. G. W. Opell Co. v. Phillips et al., Appellate Court
of Indiana, December 20, 1929, 169 N. E. 354.
It was held in Daywitt v. Daywitt, 63 Ind. App. 444, that surrounding
facts and accompanying declarations to explain the act done or the motive
therefor, are included in the res gestae and are admissible though hearsay.
The court gave little consideration to appellee's contention that Green's
statements to the officer were part of the res gestae; without discussing
the matter it decided the evidence was "pure hearsay." To be admissible
as part of the res gestae, declarations usually must be made contem-
poraneous with the principal fact, or so near in point of time that they
will be regarded as part of the transaction. Ft. Wayne Tract. Co. v.
Roudebush, 173 Ind. 57. There is ample authority within and without the
state to support the court's view that under the circumstances this was
not part of the res gestae. Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind. App. 428, a suit for
false imprisonment, held that statements made by defendant to a police-
man after the plaintiff had been released were properly excluded. And
the testimony of a policeman concerning his conversation with the driver
of a car immediately after an accident, was not received as part of the
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res gestae, because his investigation and inquiry necessarily broke the
continuity between the main facts sought to be elicited and the narrative
given of it. Itzkowitz v. Renbel & Co., 250 S. W. 535. Evidence of a con-
versation with the foreman of a shop, who had seen an employee injured,
was excluded although the conversation was held soon after the accident.
McKinon v. Norcross, 20 N. E. 183; Supreme Council, etc. v. Quarles, 97
S. E. 557.
It has been said that each case involving the question of res gestae
must be determined in the light of its own facts, because varying condi-
tions alter the application of the rule so materially. When there are con-
necting circumstances, declarations even though made some time after
the transaction, may form a part of the whole res gestae. Ins. Co. v.
Mosley, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 397. And the fact that the statements were made
in the course of conversation with a third person, not a party to the trans-
action, does not necessarily indicate that it was premeditated and there-
fore not part of the res gestae. Pratt v. State, 96 S. W. 8. A confession
made while under arrest, and therefore incompetent as a confession, was
held admissible as part of the res gestae. Powers v. State, 5 S. W. 153.
The fact that a statement was made in response to an inquiry indicates
that it was not entirely spontaneous, and this alone has been held sufficient
to require exclusion of the statement when offered as being within the
res gestae. However, other circumstances may sufficiently show that the
statement was spontaneous in spite of its being made in response to a
question. Especially is this true when the statement is inculpatory or
against interest. Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731.
It is entirely possible that in another jurisdiction the proffered evidence
might have been admitted as part of the res gestae on the theory that
Green's statements to the officer must have been spontaneously made and
while under the influence of the main transaction, for it is improbable
that a man would admit a homicide so glibely, and (seemingly) without
compulsion. The decision as handed down, however, is in accord with
the vast majority of cases on the subject. J. W. S.
INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN PLAINTIFF'S BRINGING SUIT IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION-Appellee was injured in 1927 while working as yard switch-
man in appellant's yards at Indianapolis. In 1928, appellee brought an
action in Missouri court to recover for such injuries. The appellant is a
corporation duly organized in Indiana and Ohio and operates steam rail-
road lines through these states as well as through Illinois. Appellant
brings present action to restrain such suit. The lower court denied the
injunction. Held: Judgment reversed. It would be inequitable to permit
appellee to try case at a distance since it would cause appellant needless
and irreparable damage and give to appellee an inequitable and unfair
advantage. C., C., C. and St. L. R. R. v. Shelley, 170 N. E. 328, Appellate
Court, February 25, 1930.
The problem considered here is the power of a court to enjoin a person
from prosecuting a transitory cause of action in a foreign jurisdiction.
Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142 (1907), 28 S. C. R. 34. It
would seem that the Missouri and Minnesota courts have been the haven
for parties seeking damages against railroad corporations. Weinard v.
